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Neuroscientists frequently use a certain statistical reasoning to establish the
existence of distinct neuronal processes in the brain. We show that this rea-
soning is flawed and that the large corresponding literature needs reconsider-
ation. We illustrate the fallacy with a recent study that received an enormous
press coverage because it concluded that humans detect deceit better if they
use unconscious processes instead of conscious deliberations. The study was
published under a new open–data policy that enabled us to reanalyze the data
with more appropriate methods. We found that unconscious performance was
close to chance – just as the conscious performance. This illustrates the flaws
of this widely used statistical reasoning, the benefits of open–data practices,
and the need for careful reconsideration of studies using the same rationale.
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Introduction
Lie detection is of considerable importance to modern society, in particular in connection with
police investigations, court proceedings, and security questions. For example, the U.S. gov-
ernment invests large amounts of money for training “behavior detection officers” to detect
terrorists from their behavior at airports. These programs have been criticized for being ir-
rational (Tierney, 2014) because scientific evidence suggests that humans are only correct in
approximately 54% of lie–truth judgments (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This is essentially as
good as flipping a coin. In this context, the recent lie detection study (ten Brinke, Stimson,
& Carney, 2014) presents the surprising finding that unconscious processes are much better in
detecting liars than conscious processes. Consequently, the study received enormous attention1
with potentially far–reaching practical consequences. For example, consider jurors at court
were advised “Truth or lie — trust your instinct, says research” (Briggs, 2014; Anonymous,
2014). This could make it very difficult to allow for a rational debate in cases where the truth
does not seem as obvious as our instinct might suggest (Loftus, 2003). We show that the lie
detection study does not provide “strong evidence” that “consciousness interfere[s] with the
natural ability to detect deception” (ten Brinke et al., 2014, p. 6).
The reasoning used by the lie detection study, as well as by many other studies in the Neu-
rosciences, is illustrated in Fig. 1. Participants watched two videos of interrogations. In one
video the suspect was lying, in the other the suspect was telling the truth. Participants did not
know who was the liar. The goal of the study was to find out whether participants could tell
apart liars from truth–tellers (e.g., from signs of stress). After watching the videos, participants
performed two tasks. The “direct” task (Fig. 1A) is assumed to tap conscious processes because
the participants simply see pictures of the suspects and classify these pictures as truth–tellers
or liars. As expected (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), participants were very bad in this direct task
(49.6% correct, with chance level being 50%).
Things seemed to change drastically when the “indirect” task (Fig. 1B) was performed,
which is assumed to tap unconscious processes. Now the pictures of the suspects were pre-
sented only briefly (“prime”) and hidden from consciousness by special masking techniques.
The participants sorted well visible words (the “targets”) like “honest” or “deceitful” into the
categories “truth” or “lie”. Interestingly, participants were significantly faster if such a word
was preceded by a congruent picture of a suspect (e.g., the word “deceitful” was preceded by a
picture of a liar) than if the word was preceded by an incongruent picture (e.g., the word “deceit-
ful” was preceded by a picture of truth–teller). This can only be explained if some information
1 Selected press coverage (retrieved Mar–May 2014): New York Times, Apr. 26 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/
27/business/the-search-for-our-inner-lie-detectors.html Science Magazine, Apr 1 http://news.sciencemag.org/signal-noise/
2014/03/spot-liar-trust-your-instinct BBC, Mar 29 http://www.bbc.com/news/health-26764866 British Psychological So-
ciety, Mar 28 http://www.bps.org.uk/news/our-subconscious-mind-may-detect-liars Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung, Mar 27 http://
www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/psychologie-unterbewusstsein-durchschaut-unehrlichkeit-1.1923587 The Times, Mar 26 http://www.
thetimes.co.uk/tto/science/article4045032.ece Pacific Standard, Mar 25 http://www.psmag.com/navigation/health-and-behavior/
unconscious-mind-better-detecting-lies-77368 Science Daily, Mar 24 http://www.scidai.ly/releases/2014/03/140324104520.htm
New Scientist, Mar 23 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22129610.700-invisible-how-to-see-through-lies.html
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Fig. 1: Experimental rationale and fallacy: Typically there exists some hidden stimulus attribute.
In the lie detection study this was whether the picture of a suspect showed a truth–teller or a
liar. In other studies this could be the numerical size of a number or the emotional expression
of a face that is hidden from consciousness by masking techniques. A. Direct task: When
participants directly classify the hidden attribute, they typically perform badly. B. Indirect task:
Nevertheless, the hidden attribute (“prime”) can affect RTs if participants perform a task on
another well visible stimulus (“target”). In the lie detection study, participants decided whether
well visible target–words were related to lying or truth–telling. They were faster if the targets
were preceded by a congruent but hidden picture (e.g., the word “deceitful” preceded by the
picture of a liar). While this is only possible if the hidden attribute was somehow processed
by the nervous system, the fallacy is to conclude that there was relatively good unconscious
classification accuracy of the hidden attribute, better than in the direct task.
about whether the masked picture shows a liar or a truth–teller has been processed.
However, the authors of the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al., 2014) derived further
reaching conclusions from the significant congruency effect — as is common practice in the
Neurosciences. They concluded, that (i) the significant congruency effect indicates “accurate
unconscious assessments” (p. 7) of truth–tellers vs. liars; (ii) in parallel to this accurate uncon-
scious processing, there exists another, inaccurate conscious process; (iii) the accurate uncon-
scious assessments can even be “made inaccurate [...] by conscious” processes (p. 7), such that
it might be wise to prevent “conscious deliberation about credibility” (p. 7).
We show below that all these conclusions are not warranted by the data. More generally, we
describe that a significant congruency effect alone does not provide sufficient evidence for such
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conclusions.
The fallacy
The main reason is that while the significant congruency effect indeed suggests that the primes
have been classified to a certain extent, it does not indicate how good this classification was.
The test for a significant difference between reaction times (RTs) in congruent and incongruent
trials is only concerned with the question whether a ‘true’ difference exists in the population
at all. The test does not tell us how big this difference is and for how good a classification
performance it could be harnessed.
In a nutshell: The fallacy is to conclude from a significant effect in the indirect task that
there has been good indirect classification performance of the prime (at least better than the
classification performance in the direct task). However, the significant effect only indicates
that some information about the stimuli has been processed, not how much information. Given
enough statistical power, the indirect classification performance could be arbitrarily small while
nevertheless there could be a significant congruency effect. This is not only a remote theoretical
danger, as we show with our reanalysis of the lie detection study.
Reanalysis of lie detection data For the reanalysis, we put the data of the lie detection study
to the test: If the significant congruency effect on RTs is supposed to serve as evidence for
good unconscious processing, then we should be able to use the RTs to decide for each trial
whether the prime and target stimuli were congruent or incongruent. Small RTs would indicate
a congruent trial, large RTs would indicate an incongruent trial.
We applied two classifiers to the data2: (i) the statistically optimal classifier under the as-
sumption that RTs follow normal or lognormal distributions (Ulrich & Miller, 1993) and (ii)
a model–free classifier trained on the data according to the standard protocol from statistical
learning (for details please consult the methods section). The two classifiers achieve classifi-
cation accuracies of (i) 50.6% and (ii) 49.3%. We also found that (iii) on the given data there
cannot exist a classifier with accuracy larger than 54% — the same value that was interpreted
as “detection incompetence” in the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al., 2014, p. 1). In short:
the classification accuracy in the unconscious task is just as dismal as in the conscious task and
can for all practical purposes be considered as being at chance level. There is no evidence for
“accurate unconscious assessments” (ten Brinke et al., 2014, p. 7).
Fig. 2A illustrates this with the distributions relevant for classification performance. The
average RT–difference between congruent and incongruent conditions was only 4.4 ms, whereas
2Of the two experiments in the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al., 2014), we concentrate on the second
one, as this is the one that presents ‘unconscious’ stimuli. For the first experiment we obtained similar results
(classification accuracy: 51.1%). All analyses were implemented twice independently, once in Matlab and once in
R. The R–code is open available, see Part 1 of Materials and Methods.
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Fig. 2: RT-Distributions relevant for classification and significance tests. A. Accurate classifica-
tion of congruent vs. incongruent trials requires distinct RT–distributions. The top panels show
RT-histograms for exemplary participants (left/right: participant with median/maximal accuracy
of 50.8%/56.1%). The large panel shows RT–distributions for an idealized participant, based on
average values and lognormal distributions (Ulrich & Miller, 1993). All distributions overlap so
heavily that classification accuracy is essentially at chance, showing that the RTs convey hardly
any information about congruent vs. incongruent trials. B. A significant difference requires
distinct distributions for the mean RTs of congruent vs. incongruent trials; with the standard
deviation given by the standard error of the mean (SEM; e.g., Franz & Loftus, 2012). These
distributions are clearly distinct, reflecting the significant difference (t(65) = 2.22, p = 0.03;
mean difference: 4.4 ms, SEM: 2.0 ms, Cohen’s d: 0.27; cf. Cohen, 1988). Comparing A. and
B. shows that classification accuracy can be at chance level even though the means are signifi-
cantly different. This is caused by the massive reduction of the relevant standard deviation when
calculating the SEM (cf. Part 3 in Materials & Methods). Note, that we even had to change
the scale of the abscissa in B to show the distributions appropriately. C. Histograms of RTs
in behavioral task of Dehaene et al. (1998). The distributions overlap heavily, suggesting that
classification accuracy will be low. The histogram corresponds to Figure 2b of Dehaene et al.
(1998) and was electronically digitized from the printed version. In all plots, dashed/solid lines
indicate congruent/incongruent conditions.
5
the average within–subjects standard deviation was 146.5 ms. This gives a signal–to–noise ratio
of 0.03, which is much too small for a meaningful classification performance.
To understand why this can happen even though the RT means are significantly different,
note that the classification whether a trial is congruent or incongrunent has to be performed
on a single-trial basis. In particular, the accuracy of the classifier does not improve with more
data. The statistical test for the difference in population means, on the other hand, is based on
the estimated variability of the sample means, which gets smaller with more data. As shown
in Fig. 2B, it can easily happen that two distributions are nearly indistinguishable by a classi-
fication task, yet a tiny difference in their means becomes significant if the sample size or the
number of repetitions are large enough. See Part 2 in Materials & Methods for more details.
Better approaches. What would a more appropriate approach look like? For a meaningful
comparison, we have to look not only for a significant effect, but also at how much information
is transmitted by this effect to the task of classification. A straightforward way to do this is to
consider the classification accuracy directly, as we did above. Other approaches are possible as
well. For example, one could use signal detection theory (Swets, 1961) on both tasks to deter-
mine and compare appropriate d–prime values — as has been done in some studies (Schmidt,
2002; Gegenfurtner & Franz, 2007; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). Alternatively, one could apply
classic information theory on both measures (Shannon, 1948), an approach we are currently
working on. For the lie detection study, all these methods would lead to the same conclusion:
unconscious lie detection does not work any better than its conscious counterpart. Both are
essentially at chance–level.
The problematic reasoning is widely used
One might argue that this is a limited problem of one single study. However, the problematic
reasoning is widely and routinely used. For illustration, we sketch three highly influential stud-
ies (Dehaene et al., 1998; Morris, O¨hman, & Dolan, 1998; Pessiglione et al., 2007). Many more
studies exist in the literature.
Dehaene et al. (1998) investigated whether humans can unconsciously process information
about the magnitude of numbers. Stimuli were numbers between 1 and 9 that were hidden
from consciousness by masking. Participants categorized whether the numbers were larger or
smaller than 5. In direct tasks (Fig. 1A) participants were not significantly different from chance
level (52.6% and 54% correct). Nevertheless, the masked numbers had significant effects in
indirect tasks (Fig. 1B): If participants responded to a target number that could be congruent
with the prime (e.g., both smaller than 5) or incongruent (e.g., one smaller and the other larger
than 5), then participants showed significant effects on RTs and significant lateralizations in
electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Based on
the same reasoning as outlined above, Dehaene et al. (1998) concluded that in the indirect
task participants “unconsciously appl[ied] the task instructions to the prime, would therefore
categorize it as smaller or larger than 5, and would even prepare a motor response appropriate
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to the prime” (p. 598). The authors summarize “that a large amount of cerebral processing [...]
can be performed in the absence of consciousness” (p. 599).
However, these significant differences in RTs, EEG and fMRI measurements do not tell
whether classification accuracy in the indirect task was better than in the direct task. If not, then
there would be no evidence for unconscious processing of the primes. We cannot directly eval-
uate the relevant classification performance because we do not have access to the data. Instead,
we analyzed the published histogram of all RTs performed in the behavioral task (Fig. 2C). If
we determine the classification accuracy based on these distributions, we obtain 55% correct,
which is discomfortingly close to the accuracy in the direct tasks. While this is only a very
rough estimate, it cannot rule out the possibility that there might indeed be a similar problem in
the study by Dehaene et al. (1998) as we found for the lie detection study. The only way to find
out would be replication studies or a reanalysis of the existing data.
Morris et al. (1998) investigated emotional learning in the amygdala. Two angry faces were
used as stimuli, one of which had been conditioned to an aversive event. The faces were hidden
from consciousness by masking, such that participants were at chance when classifying whether
such a face was shown to them. Nevertheless, activity in the right amygdala was significantly
modulated by the fact that one of the two faces had been associated with the aversive event,
as measured with positron emission tomography (PET). Using again the same reasoning, the
authors conclude that “we provide the first evidence that the human amygdala can discriminate
the acquired behavioral significance of stimuli without the need for conscious perception” (p.
469). Our critique is again: The significant modulation of amygdala activity does not show
whether there is also good classification accuracy that is clearly different from chance level and
that would justify the conclusion of a superior process operating in parallel to the conscious
process.
Pessiglione et al. (2007) investigated subliminal motivation. Images of coins were pre-
sented, either one pound or one penny, and hidden from consciousness by masking, such that
participants were at chance level when classifying the coins. Nevertheless, activity in the ven-
tral pallidum (VP) was significantly modulated by the value of the coins, as measured by fMRI
(similar results were found for skin conductance and grip force). The authors concluded that
there are two motivational processes, one conscious and the other unconscious: “Thus, only the
VP appeared in position to modulate behavioral activation according to subliminal incentives
and hence to underpin a low–level motivational process, as opposed to a conscious cost–benefit
calculation” (p. 906). Our concerns are again the same: The significant modulation of ac-
tivation does not tell whether the information available to the VP suffices for a classification
performance that is clearly better than the conscious classification performance. Therefore, it
is not clear whether the authors’ assumption of two processes (an unconscious and a conscious
one) for cost–benefit calculation is warranted.
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Is there unconscious processing?
Because all our example studies happen to be related to the question of whether there exists
unconscious processing independent of and parallel to conscious processing, we want to pre-
clude a potential misunderstanding. We are mainly interested in describing the methodological
fallacy, not in discussing unconscious processing. Such a discussion would go beyond the scope
of this article and would have to take into account a long history of research (Eriksen, 1960;
Holender, 1986; Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Hannula,
Simons, & Cohen, 2005; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Therefore, we do not claim that uncon-
scious processing independent of conscious processing does not exist or cannot be shown. We
do, however, claim that the lie detection study does not provide evidence for a superior uncon-
scious lie detection ability3 and that this study shows in an exemplary way how the claims of
the other studies using the same flawed rationale can go astray and need careful reconsideration
using more appropriate methods
Conclusions
We described a reasoning that is widely used but flawed. In the case of the lie detection study
(ten Brinke et al., 2014), the commendable open–data practice allowed us to show in an exem-
plary way how this reasoning can lead to wrong conclusions. More generally, conclusions of
the many studies using this reasoning should be treated with caution and could be wrong. In
the future, we should employ better statistical methods and conclusions based on the flawed
reasoning should be reconsidered.
3Note that our conclusions on the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al., 2014) are corroborated by a recent com-
mentary of lie–detection experts (Levine & Bond, 2014) who question the plausibility of the lie-detection results
in the light of other research and meta–analyses in this area. While Levine and Bond (2014) had to speculate that
one of the conditions is a statistical outlier we can now show the statistical reasons behind the wrong conclusions.
Hence, our findings converge with the intuition and meta–analytic data of these lie–detection experts.
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Materials and Methods
1 Classification and statistical optimality in more detail
In this section, we describe how an optimal classification of the single trial data in an indirect
task (Fig. 1B of main text) can be performed. We prove below that under the assumption
that the RTs follow a normal distribution or a lognormal distribution (Ulrich & Miller, 1993),
the statistically optimal classifier is given by a median split of the reaction times (“median
classifier”). We also describe a typical classifier as used in machine learning that does not
require any distributional assumptions (“trained classifier”). Finally, we derive a theoretical
upper bound for classification performance on the given data that in principle can never be
exceeded (“over–optimistic upper bound”). Before going into details, we first describe the
results of applying these classifiers to the data of the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al.,
2014).
Classification results for lie detection study. For each participant, the goal is to classify the
trials in the indirect task as ’congruent’ or ’incongruent’, based on the RTs of this participant.
For each participant, we proceed as follows. (i) For the model–based median classifier, we
compute the median RT, use this as the threshold of a step function classifier (see below), and
compute the accuracy of this classifier over all trials. (ii) For the model–free trained classifier,
we randomly split the trials into a training and test set of 50% each (other split sizes lead to very
similar results). We determine the best threshold on the training set, and compute the resulting
accuracy on the test set. We repeat this procedure 10 times with different random splits of the
data and report the average over these test accuracies. (iii) For the over–optimistic upper bound,
we evaluate the accuracy of all possible thresholds for the step function classifier over all trials
and report the best result. The following table shows means and standard deviations over the
accuracies of all participants:
Method mean(accuracy) std(accuracy)
(i) Median classifier (model: lognormal) 50.61% 2.65%
Median classifier (model: normal) 50.61% 2.65%
(ii) Trained classifier (model–free) 49.34% 2.64%
(iii) Over–optimistic upper bound 53.73% 1.99%
We can see that both the model–based (i) and model–free (ii) classifiers perform nearly exactly
at chance level. The over–optimistic upper bound shows that on this data set, there does not
exist a classifier that can obtain an accuracy higher than 54% — the value that was interpreted
as “detection incompetence” in the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al., 2014, p. 1).
General form of the optimal classifier. Consider a classification task where the input is a
real-valued number x (e.g., a reaction time, RT), and the classifier is supposed to predict one
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of two labels y (e.g., ’congruent’ or ’incongruent’; for simplicity we use labels 1 and 2 in the
following). Following the standard setup in statistical decision theory (Bishop, 2006, section
1.5) we assume that the input data X and the output data Y are drawn according to some
fixed (but unknown) probability distribution P . This distribution can be described uniquely
by the class-conditional distributions P (X |Y = 1) and P (X |Y = 2) and the class priors
pi1 = P (Y = 1) and pi2 = P (Y = 2). A classifier is a function f : IR → {1, 2} that assigns
a label y to each input x. The classifier that has the smallest probability of error is called the
Bayes classifier. In case the classes have equal weight, that is pi1 = pi2, the Bayes classifier
has a particularly simple form: it classifies an input point x by the class that has the higher
class-conditional density at this point. Formally, this classifier is given by
fopt(x) :=
{
1 if P (X = x |Y = 1) > P (X = x |Y = 2)
2 otherwise.
(1)
Optimal classifier for normal and lognormal distributions. We now consider the special
case where the class-conditionals follow a particular distribution. Let us start with the normally
distributed case. We assume that both class-conditionals are normal distributions with means
µ1, µ2 and equal variance σ2, and we denote their corresponding probability density functions
(pdfs) by ϕµ1,σ and ϕµ2,σ. Under the additional assumption that both classes have equal weights
pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the input (marginal distribution of
X) is given as
Γ(x) := 0.5 ·
(
Φ(
x− µ1
σ
) + Φ(
x− µ2
σ
)
)
, (2)
where Φ denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution. For t ∈ IR, we introduce the step
function classifier with threshold t by
ft(x) :=
{
1 if x ≤ t
2 otherwise.
(3)
In the special case where the threshold t coincides with the median of the marginal distribution
of X , we call the resulting step function classifier the median classifier.
Proposition (Median classifier is optimal for normal model) If the input distribution is given
by Eq. (2), then the optimal classifier fopt coincides with the median classifier.
Proof. Because both classes have the same weight of 0.5, the Bayes classifier is given by fopt as
in Eq. (1). For any choice of µ1, µ2 and σ, the class-conditional pdfs ϕµ1,σ and ϕµ2,σ intersect
exactly once, namely at t∗ = (µ1 + µ2)/2. By definition of fopt, the optimal classifier fopt is
then the step function classifier with threshold t∗. We now compute the value of the cdf at t∗:
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Γ(t∗) = 0.5 ·
(
Φ(
t∗ − µ1
σ
) + Φ(
t∗ − µ2
σ
)
)
= 0.5 ·
(
Φ(
µ2 − µ1
2σ
) + Φ(
µ1 − µ2
2σ
)
)
= 0.5 ·
(
Φ(
µ2 − µ1
2
) + (1− Φ(µ2 − µ1
2
)
)
= 0.5.
Here, the second last equality comes from the fact that the normal distribution is symmetric
about 0. This calculation shows that the optimal threshold t∗ indeed coincides with the median
of the input distribution, which is what we wanted to prove. 
It is easy to see that this proof can be generalized to more general types of symmetric proba-
bility distributions. It is, however, even possible to prove an analogous statement for lognormal
distributions, which are not symmetric themselves. We introduce the notation λµ,σ for the prob-
ability density function (pdf) of a lognormal distribution, and Λµ,σ for the corresponding cdf.
These functions are defined as
λµ,σ(x) :=
1
xσ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (log x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
and Λµ,σ(x) := Φ
( log x− µ
σ
)
.
Consider the case where the class-conditional distributions are lognormal distributions with
same scale parameter σ but different location parameters µ1 and µ2, and assume that both classes
have the same weights pi1 = pi2 = 0.5. Then the pdf and cdf of the input distribution (marginal
distribution of X) are given as
g(x) = 0.5 · ( λµ1,σ(x) + λµ2,σ(x) )
G(x) = 0.5 · ( Λµ1,σ(x) + Λµ2,σ(x) ). (4)
Proposition (Median classifier is optimal for lognormal model) If the input distribution is
given by Eq. (4), then the optimal classifier fopt coincides with the median classifier.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the previous one. For any choice of µ1, µ2 and σ, the densities
λµ1,σ and λµ2,σ intersect exactly once. To see this, we solve the equation λµ1,σ(t
∗) = λµ2,σ(t
∗),
which leads to the unique solution t∗ = exp((µ1 + µ2)/2). The input cdf at this value can be
computed as
G(t∗) = 0.5
(
Λµ1,σ(t
∗) + Λµ2,σ(t
∗)
)
= 0.5
(
Φ(
µ2 − µ1
2σ
) + Φ(
µ1 − µ2
2σ
)
)
= 0.5.
The last step follows as above by the symmetry of the normal cdf. 
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Training a model–free classifier. If we do not want to make any assumptions about the un-
derlying probability distribution, we can follow the standard protocol of statistical learning to
identify the threshold t of the best step function classifier. For each participant, we are given
trials in form of input-output pairs (Xi, Yi)i=1,...,n, Xi ∈ IR, Yi ∈ {1, 2}. We randomly split
this data set into a training set consisting of 50% and a test set of the remaining 50% of all
trials. On the training set, we determine the threshold t∗ that leads to the smallest number of
misclassifications (= training error). For the corresponding step function classifier ft∗ we now
compute the error on the test set (= test error). We repeat this procedure 10 times to remove
potential subsampling artifacts and report the mean over these repetitions. For readers familiar
with machine learning, note that in this simple scenario, no model selection is involved, so a
more complex evaluation procedure such as cross validation is not necessary.
An over–optimistic upper bound on classification accuracy. To rule out the case that the
result of the model–free classifier is seriously sub-optimal (due to the effect of splitting the
data in training and test sets, or due to overfitting or underfitting), we can derive an upper
bound on the accuracy of the best step function classifier that possibly exists on the given data.
For each participant, we cycle through all possible thresholds t and evaluate the accuracy of
the corresponding step function classifier ft on all trials. We then select the best accuracy
obtained in this way as the classification accuracy of this participant. This accuracy is overly
optimistic, as this classifier usually overfits and exploits sampling artifacts. On the other hand, it
gives an upper bound on the classification accuracy that any other step function classifier could
potentially achieve on the data. Finally, note that in the context of the RT experiment, it would
not make sense to consider classifiers that do not have the form of a step function classifier —
the general classification scenario implied by the experimental setup is to separate slow RTs
from fast RTs.
2 Why is the relevant standard deviation for the significance test much
smaller than that for classification?
Let us illustrate our answer with the data of the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al., 2014).
Consider two probability distributions with slightly different expected values, such as the ones
in Fig. 2A. The task of the classifier is to predict for each trial whether the measured RT has been
generated from a congruent or an incongruent condition. More abstractly, given a real-valued
sample, we want to decide which of the two distributions is more likely to have generated
that sample point. In general, this will only be possible in a satisfactory manner if the two
distributions have only little overlap and their means are considerably different from each other.
The significance test, on the other hand, assesses whether the expected values of the two
distributions are different at all. It does not ask for a large difference, it just asks for any
difference. The more measurements are taken, the closer each mean estimate will be to the
corresponding expected value. We know from the central limit theorem that the SEM is of order
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1/
√
n. In the limiting case of an infinite number of measurements, the SEM would approach
zero.
To get a feeling for this effect, consider the data of the lie detection study. For a rough
estimate, let us for a moment ignore the fact that there were different participants (i.e., that
between–subjects variability exists; this is not so critical because we are dealing with within–
subjects designs such that the difference mainly is affected by within–subjects variability (Franz
& Loftus, 2012)). The average standard deviation for a trial was 146.5 ms (Fig. 2A). Each con-
dition was measured about 180 times in each participant and the study had 66 participants,
which leads to a factor of 1/
√
180 · 66. Taking the difference between the congruent and incon-
gruent conditions increases the SEM by a factor of
√
2 (assuming for simplicity independence
and equal variances), such that a rough prediction for the SEM relevant for the significance test
is given as 146.5 ·√2/√180 · 66 ms = 1.9 ms. This is close to the empirically obtained 2.0 ms.
3 If the means are significantly different, doesn’t this imply that the clas-
sification accuracy is significantly different from chance level?
If we have enough statistical power, significance tests will eventually show that classification is
different from chance if the means are significantly different. (In real data, both significances
might not occur at the same time because sources of noise are not exactly identical for the means
and the classification results.)
However, with regard to the reasoning outlined in Fig. 1 of the main paper, this question
is misleading. For the typical neuroscientific interpretation it is not only important that the
classification accuracy in the indirect task is significantly different from chance level (this could
also happen if the true classification performance were, say, 51%). What counts is whether the
classification accuracy is considerably larger than chance level, and in particular, considerably
larger than the accuracy obtained in the direct task. This leads back to the old statistical issue of
needing to distinguish between the statistical significance of effects vs. the size of the effects.
4 Many studies did not test for the difference of the effects. Isn’t this also
a problem?
The correct procedure would indeed be to test for the difference (Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008;
Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011). This is, however, an issue independent of
the general fallacy we are concerned with, so we do not discuss it further.
5 The lie detection study calculated Cohen’s d values. Doesn’t this ame-
liorate the problem?
While most studies used the RTs in the indirect task for their significance test, the lie detection
study (ten Brinke et al., 2014) used a somewhat different approach. For each participant an
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individual Cohen’s d value (Cohen, 1988) was computed from the RTs, resulting for the 66
participants in d1, ..., d66. Then, a significance test was performed on these values and a second
Cohen’s d value dacross was calculated across the individual values d1, ..., d66. This value dacross
is what is shown in Fig. 2 (Exp. 2) of the lie detection study (ten Brinke et al., 2014), it was
found to be dacross = 0.27 (ten Brinke et al., 2014, p. 6). This means that the Cohen’s d–values
used in this figure refer to the question of whether the means of the RTs are different from each
other (which they very well can be, as we explained above). It does not say anything about
the effect size of the indirect classification performance, which would be the relevant quantity.
The relevant Cohen’s d–values computed on the distribution that is relevant to classification
(our Fig. 2A) amount on average to 0.03 (ten Brinke et al., 2014, p. 6), which is very small
and therefore fully consistent with the results of our classifiers (for pychophysicists: this is
equivalent to a very small d–prime value in signal detection theory).
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